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LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-PENNSYLVANIA ENACTS COMPARATIVE NEGLI-
GENCE STATUTE. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. -, No. 152.
On July 9,1976, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a statute
"establishing the doctrine of comparative negligence in actions for dam-
ages for injuries due to negligence, and providing for recovery against and
contribution among joint [tortfeasors]. "1 The statute changes the hereto-
fore existing in toto defense of contributory negligence to a defense pro
tanto and modifies in applicable situations the contribution scheme enun-
ciated in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.
2
Pennsylvania's version of comparative negligence 3 allows recovery
by a plaintiff if his contributory negligence is less than or equal to that of the
defendant. 4 When the plaintiff does qualify for recovery, it is limited in
1. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. -, No. 152 (to be codified in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§
2101-02 (Purdon)) [hereinafter cited as Act 152]. The text of the Act is as follows:
Section 1. Comparative Negligence.-In all actions brought to recover damages
for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the
plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by
the plaintiff or his legal representative where such negligence was not greater than
the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is
sought, but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
Section 2. Recovery Against Joint Defendant: Contribution.- Where recovery is
allowed against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that
proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount
of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed.
The plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed recovery from any
defendant against whom such plaintiff is not barred from recovery. Any defendant
who is so compelled to pay more than his percentage share may seek contribution.
Section 3. Effective Date.-This act shall take effect in 60 days.
Section 1 is modeled after N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-77).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2082-89 (Purdon 1967).
3. Three distinct forms of comparative negligence statutes have been enacted. First is
the so-called "pure" form, under which the plaintiff's recoverable damages are reduced by
his contributory negligence regardless of the proportion of his negligence to the total
negligence. Mississippi is the only state to have adopted this type of statute. See MISS. CODE
ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972). The "modified" form holds that at some point, for example when the
plaintiff's contributory negligence exceeds the negligence of the defendants, recovery by the
plaintiff is precluded. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1763 to -1765 (Cum. Supp. 1975). The
Pennsylvania statute is of this type. The third form differentiates between slight and gross
negligence of the plaintiff. According to this theory damages will be apportioned if the
plaintiff's negligence is slight and the defendant's negligence is gross. Nebraska is the only
state with a statute of this type. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1964).
See generally Note, An Inquiry Into Comparative Negligence for Pennsylvania, 18 U.
PiTr. L. REV. 783-89 (1957). For a comparison of the statutes as adopted by the various states
see Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 463, 473-78 (1970).
4. See Act 152, § 1, quoted at note I supra. An amendment was introduced that would
have required the plaintiff's negligence to be less than the defendant's negligence before
proportion to the total damage attributable to the defendant's negligence. 5
The statute also makes provision for recovery from and contribution among
joint tortfeasors: the plaintiff is allowed full recovery from any defendant
and that defendant may then seek contribution. In the case of multiple
defendants, each defendant is required to contribute in the proportion that
his causal negligence bears to the causal negligence of all defendants. 6
Although there has been confusion concerning the retroactive applicability
of the statute,7 it is clear that comparative negligence does not apply to
causes of action arising prior to September 7, 1976.8
The harshness of allowing contributory negligence as a total defense
to a plaintiff's plea for recovery, 9 the necessity of using various legal
theories to avoid this harsh effect, and the refusal of juries to strictly apply
contributory negligence have all lent impetus to the enactment of compara-
tive negligence legislation. 10 Thus, comparative negligence statutes are
common in the United States. 1 Act 152 is the culmination of three decades
allowing comparison of relative causal negligence. See LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-SENATE.
Session of 1976, vol. 1, No. I10 at 1703.
5. See Act 152, § 1, quoted at note I supra.
6. See Act 152, § 2, quoted at note I supra.
7. Memorandum from Timothy J. O'Connell to Senator Henry G. Hager (September
9, 1976).
8. See Act 152, § 3, quoted at note I supra. Nothing in the Pennsylvania Constitution
expressly forbids retroactive legislation, but "no law shall be construed to be retroactive
unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the Legislature." I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1926
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1976-77). Just as the repeal of the statute under which a cause of action
arose does not destroy the cause of action, O'Toole, Comparative Negligence: The Pennsyl-
vania Proposal, 2 VILL. L. REV. 474, 477 (1957), citing Rebel v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co.,
340 Pa. 313, 318-19, 16 A.2d 534, 537 (1940), so are defenses treated as similarly vested.
O'Toole, Comparative Negligence: The Pennsylvania Proposal, 2 VILL. L. REV. 474, 477
(1957), citing Kay v. Pennsylvania R.R., 65 Pa. 269, 277 (1870). In Lewis v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 220 Pa. 317, 69 A. 821 (1908), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated, 'A legal
exemption from liability on a particular demand, constituting a complete defense to an action
brought, stands on quite as high a ground as a right of action." Id. at 324, 69 A. at 823.
9. According to that doctrine when the plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of
his injury recovery was barred. McCay v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 447 Pa. 490, 495, 291 A.2d
759,762 (1972). Prior to this opinion two divergent lines of cases existed in Pennsylvania. One
line barred plaintiff's recovery even when his negligence was not a proximate cause of the
injury. See, e.g., O'Neill v. United States, 411 F.2d 139, 141 (3d Cir. 1969). The otherrequired
that the plaintiff's negligence be a proximate cause of his injury before recovery was barred.
See, e.g., Cebulskie v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 441 Pa. 230, 234, 272 A.2d 171, 173 (1971).
10. See Bress, Comparative Negligence: Let Us Harken to the Call of Progress, 43
A.B.A.J. 127(1957). But see Harkavy, Comparative Negligence: The Reflections of a Skeptic,
43 A.B.A.J. 1115 (1957).
II. In addition to Pennsylvania, the following states and territories have passed
comparative negligence statutes: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1763 to-1765 (Cum. Supp.
1975); Canal Zone, C.Z. CODE tit. 4, § 1357 (1936); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111
(Cum. Supp. 1976); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 52-572h (West Cum. Supp. 1977);
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1968); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (Supp. 1975);
Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14,§ 156(Cum. Supp. 1976-77); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-77); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. §604.01 (West,
Cum. Supp. 1977); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); Nebraska, NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-1151 (1964); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 15-5.1 to -5.3 (West Cum. Supp.
1976-77); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 11-12 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-77); Puerto
Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §5141 (1968); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp.
1976); South Dakota, S. D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967); Texas, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-77); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036(1973);
Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-77); Wyoming, WYO. STAT. §
1-7.2 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
Three other states have adopted comparative negligence through judicial action: Califor-
nia, Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975);
Florida, Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Tennessee, Southern Ry. v. Pugh, 97
Tenn. 624, 37 S.W. 555 (1896).
of legislative indecision during which time Pennsylvania plaintiffs have
labored under the antiquated doctrine of contributory negligence.
12
Pennsylvania courts have long recognized the harsh effect of having a
plaintiff's entire recovery hinge on the absence of his or her contributory
negligence. They have developed the discovered peril 13 and the wanton
and reckless tortfeasor14 doctrines to mitigate this result. Implementation
of comparative negligence will require reconsideration of the continued
necessity of these doctrines.
Under the discovered peril doctrine a contributorily negligent plaintiff
may recover if it is shown that the defendant failed to exercise a reasonable
standard of care after he knew or should have known of the plaintiff's
peril. 15 Since the purpose of the doctrine is sufficiently encompassed by the
comparative negligence statute, a reasonable conclusion is that its transi-
tional usefulness has ended. 16
On the other hand, when a defendant's act was wantonly, willfully or
recklessly committed, contributory negligence has never posed a bar to a
Pennsylvania plaintiff's award. 17 New Jersey subscribed to a similar
doctrine before it enacted a comparative negligence statute. Its courts have
Some states apply comparative negligence only in limited types of cases: Alaska,
ALASKA STAT. § 23.25.020 (1962) (master-servant cases); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-806
(1976) (workmen's compensation); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 705.280 (1971) (suits against
railroads); Virginia, VA. CODE § 8-642 (1951) (suits against common carriers).
The federal government has also adopted comparative negligence for certain cases.
Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1970) (admiralty cases); Federal Employer's
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1970) (employees' suits against railroads).
12. A list of attempts at legislative action in Pennsylvania is as follows: H. 604, Session
of 1943 (noted in Comparative Negligence in Pennsylvania?, 17 TEMP. L.Q. 276 (1943)); H.
667, Session of 1955 (noted in Note, Comparative Negligence, 60 DICK. L. REV. 79(1955)); H.
88, Session of 1957 (noted in An Inquiry Into Comparative Negligence for Pennsylvania, 18 U.
PITT. L. REV. 783 (1957)); H. 579, Session of 1971; H. 752, Session of 1975;S. 957, Session of
1975; S. 1237, Session of 1975.
13. See, e.g., Curt v. Ziman, 140 Pa. Super. Ct. 25, 12 A.2d 802 (1940). See note 15 and
accompanying text infra.
14. See, e.g., Kasvanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943).
15. 27 P.L.E. Negligence § 101, at 178 (1960). This doctrine is a sub-species of the
doctrine of last clear chance and is sub rosa a judicial amelioration of the effects of
contributory negligence. There are two divergent views concerning the last clear chance
doctrine. One view holds that last clear chance is a search for who caused the harm, and
consequently, for who should be held liable. See Maclntyre, Last Clear Chance After Thirty
Years Under The Apportionment Statutes, 33 CAN. B. REV. 257 (1955). This view requires
that one or the other of the parties be held liable and cannot co-exist with the doctrine of
comparative negligence. Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846 (Me. 1968). Pennsylvania has
adhered to this approach. See, e.g. Curt v. Ziman, 140 Pa. Super. Ct. 25. 12 A.2d 802 (1940).
The other view holds that the last clear chance doctrine is not an exception to the
contributory negligence doctrine, because the conduct in the seminal case of Davis v. Mann,
152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842), did not actually involve contributory negligence. See Davis v- Mann
and Contributory Negligence Statutes, 9 CAN. B. REV. 470 (1931). States following this view
have continued to adhere to the last clear chance doctrine. See, e.g., Lovett v. Sandersville
R.R., 72 Ga. App. 692, 697-98, 34 S.E.2d 664, 667 (1945).
16. This conclusion is consonant with current judicial and legislative trends. See
Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846 (Me. 1968); Switzer v. Detroit Inv. Co., 188 Wis. 330,206
N.W. 407 (1925). The last clear chance doctrine has been statutorily abolished in Connecticut.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1977). See generally James, Last
.Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938). Several states, however,
have taken a contrary view. See, e.g., Lovett v. Sandersville R.R., 72 Ga. App. 692, 34 S.E.2d
664 (1945); Vlach v. Wyman, 78 S.D. 504, 104 N.W.2d 817 (1960). For a collection of relevant
decisions, see Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1261 (1958).
17. Misorski v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 204, 34 A.2d 526 (1943); Kasanovich v.
George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943).
held that the plaintiff's action against a willful, wanton or reckless
defendant remains unaffected by the adoption of comparative negli-
gence. 1 8 Public policy would appear to dictate similar results in
Pennsylvania.
Closely related to contributory negligence is the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk. Although assumption of risk was not designed to improve the
plaintiff's chances of recovery, as were the discovered peril and the
wanton, willful and reckless tortfeasor doctrines, its integral association
with contributory negligence compels an examination of its continuing
legal necessity.
The assumption of risk doctrine states that a defendant will not be held
liable if the plaintiff has knowingly assumed the consequences of a
negligent situation, albeit a situation created by the defendant.' 9 A problem
arises because Pennsylvania courts have not found it necessary to distin-
guish assumption of risk from causal negligence. 20 Since causal negligence
is the basis upon which the proportional negligence of the parties is
ascertained under the comparative negligence statute, 21 it would initially
seem that the doctrine of assumption of risk is encompassed by the statute.
But the conduct of which the plaintiff is guilty in assumption of risk cases is
recklessness, not negligence. 22 It would therefore appear contrary to
efficacious public policy to compare the negligence of a defendant with the
recklessness of the plaintiff and require that the defendant pay for a
proportion of the plaintiff's injury. Thus, under Act 152, courts should, in
appropriate situations, continue to allow assumption of risk as a defense in
toto.
Not only have Pennsylvania's courts adopted ameliorative theories,
but juries, with some semblance of judicial approval, have failed to strictly
18. Draney v. Bachman, 138 N.J. 503, 351 A.2d 409 (1976); Burd v. Vercruysoin, 142
N.J. Super. Ct. 344, 361 A.2d 571 (1976). Cf. Mallory v. Cloud, - Mont. -, 535 P.2d 1270
(1975).
19. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 440 (4th ed. 1971).
20. See Jerdon v. Sirulniek, 400 Pa. 423, 162 A.2d 202 (1960); Loeb v. Allegheny
County, 394 Pa. 433, 147 A.2d 336 (1959).
21. See Act 152, § 1, quoted at note 1 supra.
22. See Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943) (analogy to the wanton
tortfeasor doctrine). But see Manassa v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 332 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1976) (assumption of risk is a special form of contributory negligence).
Based on an examination of the case law, it is reasonable to conclude that Pennsylvania
courts will continue to hold that reckless-not negligent-conduct is necessary to bar
plaintiff's recovery when the defendant seeks to invoke the doctrine of assumption of risk.
Prior cases have so held. See Hall v. Ziegler, 361 Pa. 228,230,64 A.2d 767,769 (1949); Elliot v.
Philadelphia Trans. Co., 356 Pa. 643, 648,53 A.2d 81,83 (1947); Eaell v. Wichser, 346 Pa. 357,
359, 30 A.2d 803, 804 (1943); Ruh] v. City of Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 214, 221,29 A.2d 784, 787
(1943); Guerierro v. Reading R.R. Co., 346 Pa. 187, 191,29A.2d 510, 513, (1943); Casseday v.
B & 0 R.R., 343 Pa. 342,22 A.2d663,665 (1941); McFadden v. Pernzoil Co., 341 Pa. 433,437,
19 A.2d 370, 372 (1941).
Nevertheless, there is authority abolishing assumption of risk in states having compara-
tive negligence statutes. See, e.g., McConville v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374,
113 N.W.2d 14 (1962). In McConville the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that "[c]onduct
. . . denominated assumption of risk may constitute contributory negligence as well [and
that] unreasonable assumption of risk constitutes negligence." Id. at 380, 113 N.W.2d at
19.See also Parker v. Maule Indus., Inc., 321 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Wilson v.
Gordon, 354 A.2d 398 (Me. 1976).
apply the doctrine of contributory negligence. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has recognized that "[tihe doctrine of comparative negligence...
is not recognized by the Courts of Pennsylvania, but as a practical matter [it
is] frequently taken into consideration by a jury. . . . [1In a large majority
of . . . cases where the evidence of negligence is not clear . . . the jury
brings in a compromise verdict." 23 These jury compromises, which were
sub judicia a realization of the intent and operation of comparative
negligence, mandated legislative action in the form of comparative
negligence.
As seen above, the elimination of existing legal doctrines or their
interface with comparative negligence raises troublesome theoretical prob-
lems. The practical operation of the comparative negligence statute is
similarly vexatious. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
negligence,24 the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. If the defendant is
partially or fully to escape liability, he or she must then prove that the
plaintiff's own negligence contributed to the injury. If it can also be shown
that such contributory negligence was greater than the causal negligence of
all of the defendants against whom recovery is sought, the plaintiff is
barred from recovery. 25 It is therefore beneficial for the plaintiff to proceed
against as many tortfeasors as possible. To illustrate, if there were two
possible defendants, and if each defendant was twenty-five percent negli-
gent, a fifty percent negligent plaintiff could not collect unless he sought
recovery against both defendants. 26 It is reasonable to assume that the
plaintiff may not include with the defendant's fault that proportion of fault
attributable to unreachable parties. 27 To do so would create a dispropor-
tionate spreading of risks contrary to the basic philosophy of comparative
negligence.28
The question of proportion of fault is unquestionably one for the trier
of fact to decide. A serious failing in the Pennsylvania version of compara-
tive negligence, therefore, is the failure of the legislature to provide for a
special verdict, a device recommended by several commentators for use in
such cases. 29 The case of contribution among multiple defendants provides
23. Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 234, 114 A.2d 150, 154 (1955).
24. To establish a prima facie case of negligence the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant owed him a duty, that defendant breached that duty, and that the defendant's
breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Evans v. Golfine Truck Rental
Service, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 361 A.2d 643 (1976).
25. See Act 152, § 1, quoted at note I supra.
26. To the effect that the concern is with comparative fault and not comparative
contribution, see Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 481 (1953). But see
Campbell, Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Law, 7 Wis. L. REV. 222, 231 (1932).
27. The statute states that the plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed
recovery from any defendant against whom such plaintiff is not barred from recovery. See
Act 152, § 2, quoted at note 1, supra.
28. O'Toole, Comparative Negligence: The Pennsylvania Proposal, 2 VILL. L. REV.
474, 481 (1957).
29. An amendment was offered to Act 152 which would have required that the jury or
the court in a non-jury trial answer specific questions. Under this amendment the trier of fact
would have been required to specify the amount of damages that the party bringing the action
would be entitled to recover had the person not been at fault, and the degree of negligence of
an example of the need for such a device. Whereas under the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act contribution was in aliquot
portions, 30 under comparative negligence contribution is in the ratio of
each defendant's causal negligence to the total causal negligence of all of
the defendants "against whom recovery is allowed." 3 1 Under Act 152 the
jury must not only allocate causal negligence between the plaintiff and the
defendants en masse, but it must also allocate the defendants' total causal
negligence among those various defendants on a per culpa basis. The
special verdict would allow for judicial overview of discrepancies that
might arise in the jury's analysis of such difficult questions of fact.
The natural consequences of comparative negligence go beyond its
apparent effect on substantive and procedural law to the very core of the
negligence policy conceptualizing network-the insurance industry. Com-
parative negligence requires that the plaintiff be held responsible for a
proportion of the loss for which he is unlikely to be insured.32 Whereas
jurors' sympathies were somewhat apt to keep the plaintiff from feeling the
fatal effect of the application of contributory negligence, 33 under compara-
tive negligence the plaintiff must now bear responsibility for a portion of
the damages.
34
each party expressed as a percentage. LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-SENATE, Session of 1976, vol.
I, No. 110 at 1703.
The use of the special verdict in conjunction with comparative negligence is recom-
mended in Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 465, 503 (1953), and in
Cadena, Comparative Negligence and the Special Verdict, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 688 (1974). But
see Smith, Comparative Negligence Problems with the Special Verdict: Informing the Jury of
the Legal Effects of their Answers. 10 LAND & WATER L.J. 199 (1974).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-89 (Purdon 1967).
31. See Act 152, § 2, quoted at note 1, supra.
32. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 22.11, at 1234 (1956).
33. Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 234, 114 A.2d 150, 154 (1955).
34. While initially this analysis tends to indicate a decrease in insurance rates, such is
not the case. Although fewer cases will be litigated, see Averbach, Comparative Negligence
Legislation: A Cure for Our Congested Courts, 19 ALB. L. REV. 4, 11 (1955), and the size of
awards will decrease, the increase in the number of awards will cause insurance rates to rise.
Grubb, Comparative Negligence, 32 NEB. L. REV. 234, 246 (1953).
[Statute Note by Harry R. Swift.]
